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CHAPTERV
Planning and the trade regime in the 1960's
Whereas the Turkish foreign trade regime of the 19 50's was largely inde-
pendent of domestic objectives, that of the 1960's was closely interrelated
with domestic economic policy. As indicated above, there was no conscious
planning or coordination of economic policies in the 1950's, and economic
goals did not closely interrelate with the nature of the trade regime except
insofar as the expenditures undertaken were contributory to balance-of-
payments stringency. Indeed, the lack of planning and coordination of eco-
nomic policy was one of the criticisms leveled at the Menderes government in
its last years and after its downfall.
When a new constitution was formulated under the Revolutionary govern-
ment in 1960—1961, one of the key changes was that planning for social and
economic development was defined as the duty of the State:
Economic and social life shall be regulated in a manner consistent with justice, and
the principle of full employment, with the objective of assuring for everyone a
standard of living befitting human dignity.
It is the duty of the State to encourage economic, social and cultural development
by democratic processes and for this purpose to enhance national savings, to give
priority to those investments which promote public welfare, and to draw up develop-
ment projects. 1
Further,the State Planning Organization was established as the planning or-
gan within the constitution. Under the heading, "Development projects and
the State Planning Organization," Article 129 reads:
Economic, social and cultural development is based on a plan. Development is
carried out according to this plan.
The organization and functions of the State Planning Organization, the principles
to be observed in the preparation and execution, and application and revision of the
plan, and the measures designed to prevent changes tending to impair the unity of the
plan, shall be regulated by special legislation.2
Thus development plans became central to government economic policy in
the 1960's. Through the plans and their implementation, the foreign trade
regime was much more closely related to other economic policies than it had
been in the 1950's.
1. Constitution of the Turkish Republic, translated for the Committee of National Unity
(Ankara), 1961, Article 41.
2. Ibid., official translation, Article 129.The purpose of this chapter is to examine the nature and evolution of
economic policy in the 1960's and to evaluate the relationship between trade
policy and domestic economic goals. The first section contains a brief descrip-
tion of the planning mechanism and its relationship to the execution of
policy. The second section outlines the major characteristics of the Plans and
examines the degree to which Plan targets were achieved. The third section is
concerned with the role of the foreign trade sector within the Plans. Finally,
the role of foreign aid, foreign indebtedness, and private foreign capital in the
1960's is considered.
I. The planning mechanism and execution of economic policy
The State Planning Organization (SPO), as stated in the constitution, is
the government body assigned the responsibility for Plan preparation in
Turkey. It is also given the duty of following up on the implementation of
the Plan and advising on current economic policy. With one exception, the
SPOdoesnot have operational responsibilities and is advisory in nature.3 But
when the SPO's recommendations are adopted by the cabinet, as they must
be before they become official policy, their impact is greater than that of
most advisory organizations.
Since the inception of planning in the early 1960's, the SPO has drawn up
two Plans: the First Five Year Plan (FFYP) covering 1963 to 1967, and the
Second Five Year Plan (SFYP) covering 1968 to The SPO prepares an
Annual Ptogram each year in which detailed annual plans are presented and
the progress of the economy is monitored.
Although the SPO is not responsible for the implementation of policy
except for matters coming under the purview of the Investment and Export
Promotion Department,5 itis empowered to monitor the actions of other
government agencies with a view to determining the degree to which plan
goals are carried out. In the late 1960's, for example, applications for licenses
3. The SPO itself has two closely interrelated bodies: the High Planning Council and the
Central Planning Organization. The Central Planning Organization had three depart-
ments until 1967: Economic Planning, Social Planning, and Coordination. In 1967, a
fourth department was added: Investment and Export Promotion. That department is
operational, concerned with implementing export rebates and export and investment
incentives. The Central Planning Organization is headed by an Undersecretary, who
reports directly to the Prime Minister. The High Planning Council consists of the
Prime Minister, the Undersecretary heading up the SPO, the heads of the original three
Departments comprising the CPO, and three other members of the Prime Minister's
cabinet.
4. At the time of writing, the Third Five Year Plan for 1973 to 1977 is being prepared.
5. Even these implementation functions were removed in 1971.
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for capital goods imports had to be checked by the SPO to ensure that the
proposed investments were consistent with the Plan before the license was
approved. This power in itself gives the SPO considerable influence in eco-
nomic policy.
II. The five year plans: goals and achievements
Overall goals
Prior to the FFYP a document, "Plan Objectives and Strategy," was pre-
pared which laid forth the development goals to be achieved over the subse-
quent fifteen years. Although that document is relatively sparse in quantita-
tive details, it set the two objectives which have remained fundamental in the
FFYP and SFYP: (1) a target rate of growth of 7 per cent per annum and (2)
continued development at the seven-per-cent rate without further foreign
assistance, by 1977 at the latest:
.Turkey may reach a stage before the end of fifteen years and probably at the end
of the second five years when she can continue her development efforts without
being in need of exceptional external finance such as foreign aid.6
Foreign aid was counted upon to cover the gaps between investment and
savings projected for the early years of the fifteen-year period.
The basic reasoning underlying the "Objectives and Strategy" was a
straightforward Harrod—Domar capital-output-investment relationship. Al-
though a few specific numbers were given for 1977, they were more in the
nature of forecasts than of policy prescriptions. For example, the share of
agriculture in GNP was expected to decline from 43.8 per cent in 1962 to
29.4 per cent in 1977, with increases in the shares of services and manufac-
turing from 12.8 and 9.8 to 26.3 and 15.6 per cent, respectively. An indica-
tion of the policies by which these forecasts or targets would be achieved was
left to the Plans and the Annual Programs.
Although both Plans accepted the dual targets of the "Objectives and
Strategy," there were differences between them in the choice of instruments
to meet particular targets and also in the emphasis given to the public sector.
As indicated in Chapter I, the 1965 elections brought the Justice Party under
Prime Minister Demired to power, whereas the Republican Peoples' Party
(RPP) had ruled in a coalition government prior to that time. The FFYP,
formulated under the RPP coalition government, placed slightly greater em-
phasis upon direct intervention in the economy and on the public sector's
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role in development than did the SFYP. The SFYP by contrast leaned more
toward the use of price incentives and reliance upon the private sector. Thus
the FFYP declared:
The private sector alone cannot realize all the conditions necessary for economic
development. Economic development will be attained by accelerating investment and
making basic changes in the structure and methods of production. These changes
cannot be accomplished solely by entrepreneurs who adjust their activities according
to market conditions... It is neither necessary nor possible to draw a definite line
between the activities of the public and private sectors. The State should be author-
ized to regulate economic activities with a view to create the conditions required for
the attainment of the objectives of the plan. The State should be in the vanguard of
progress in the industrial sectors...
Contrast this with the statements in the SFYP:
The static and dynamic efficiency of the economy will be achieved mainly through
the market mechanism...The State will insure price stability and minimise the defi-
ciencies of the price mechanism through indirect means such as tax, credit, money
and foreign trade policies...The policies to be adopted in the Second Plan period wifi
enable the private sector to take over the development of manufacturing industry in
the long run...8
Thus although both Plans accepted the fact of SEEs, the emphasis upon price
incentives was greater in the SFYP period, while that upon direct government
investments was greater in the FFYP.
The FFYF.9Investment in the FFYP was to rise from 14.8 per cent of
GNP to 18.3 per cent of GNP. This increase was to be accomplished by a rise
in the average savings rate from 12.8 to 14.8 per cent and an increase in
external financing from 2 to 3.5 per cent of GNP, with an estimated incre-
mental capital-output ratio of 2.6. Government revenues were to increase
from 24.7 to 27.5percent of GNP, while expenditures were to increase by
the same amount, thereby implying that the increase in government invest.
ments would be financed by additional savings (including the surpluses of
SEEs), and that private investment increases would be offset by increases in
private savings.
Planned sectoral investments and income originating in those sectors in
1961 are given in Table V-i. Although the sector classifications are not entire-
ly comparable, it is evident that heavy emphasis was placed upon infrastruc-
ture investments. As indicated in the FFYP,
7. FFYP, op. cit. (Note 20, Chap. I), p. 54.
8. Ibid. (Note 21, Chap.!), pp. 111—2.
9. Data given in this paragraph are drawn from ibid. (Note 20, Chap. 1), pp. 104—117.d theTrade Regime in the1 960's The Anatomy oftheRegime in the 1960's 123













Note: In the national income estimate, housing services are included in "Dwelling
ownership."
Source:FFYP, op.cit. (Note 20, Chap. I), pp. 14 and 121, and National Income,
1938, 1948—1970, .Ptjb. No. 625, SIS (Ankara), 1971. See Table 1-3.
Sustained development implies that the production of basic goods and services should
be geared to meet long-term demand. Due importance has therefore been attached to
basic infrastructure investments (e.g., transport, energy, education, etc.).10
Other principles upon which sectoral development plans were based included:
the prevention of bottlenecks, maintenance of output of raw materials and
intermediate goods production in line with final demands, and the promotion
...of sectors producing export goods and those producing import-replacing goods. In
view of the foreign exchange difficulties likely to occur during the plan period
importance was attached both to expanding exports and promoting import-substitu-
tion."
As will be seen below, considerably greater quantitative importance was
placed upon import-substitution than upon export promotion.
Although the goals of the FFYP were not entirely realized, Turkish eco-
nomic growth over the 1963-to-1967 period was satisfactory from any stand-
point and considerably better than it had been in earlier years. Real GNP,
which had been expected to be 40 per cent above the 1962 level, was 38 per
cent above it in 1967. Agricultural production fell somewhat short of the
target, increasing 17 per cent contrasted with a projected 24 per cent in-
crease. Manufacturing production rose 63 per cent compared to the 73 per
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Real investment increased considerably less rapidly than expected, espe-
cially in the early years of the FFYP. Private sector investments grew more
rapidly than had been anticipated, whereas public sector investments fell
short of plan targets. A higher fraction of private sector investment was
directed toward residential construction and a lower fraction toward industry
than had been anticipated.
Perhaps the biggest discrepancy between domestic targets and achieve-
ments at the macro-level was the failure of public revenues to keep pace with
their expected increase. The rate of price increase remained relatively low
despite that, averaging about 5 per cent annually.
The balance of payments proved even more of a bottleneck than had been
forecast, despite an export performance better than that projected in the
Plan. Export projections had been based upon estimated export earnings of
$325 million in 1962, whereas actual exports were $381 million. Targeted
exports for 1967 were $457 million contrasted with actual 1967 exports of
$523 mfflion. Moreover, an unanticipated source of foreign exchange earnings
emerged during the FFYP period: the remittances of Turkish workers in
Western Europe. Whereas Turkish workers in Western Europe had been rela-
tively few in number intheearly 1960's, their numbers rapidly increased in
the mid-1960's. Thus workers' remittances were less than $1 million in 1963,
$9 mfflion in 1964, $70 million in 1965, $115 million in 1966 and $93
million in 1967.
Actual imports were very close to the planned level of $3,200 million for
the five-year period as a whole, but their timing differed somewhat. Imports
in 1963 were $688 million compared to the FFYP figure of $567 million;'3
while in later years imports were smaller than the projected figures except for
1966. Moreover, imports were kept near their projected level by greater
stringency in the import regime than had been planned or desired.
The big discrepancy between balance-of-payments projections and realiza-
tions in foreign aid. The planners had estimated a PL 48014 inflow of
$290 million over the five years, whereas it was actually $166 million. Con-
sortium credits had been put at $1 ,573 million, whereas they actually were
13. Workers' remittances are recorded as an invisible current account transaction in
Turkish balance-of-payments statistics, and are therefore reflected as one of the
components in the difference between the trade balance and the current account
balance. Workers' remittances were $273 million in 1970. See Appendix C. The 1963
import figure reflected, inter alla, huge imports in connection with the construction
of the Steel MilL
14. Under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (Public Law
480) and its subsequent amendments, the United States exports agricultural com-
modities and provides financing on terms more favorable than commercially-available
rates, including loans in soft-currency.
'I.
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$827 million. Thus the current account deficit proved to be smaller than
anticipated by $485 million, but that was offset by a shortfall on capital
account of $746 million in consortium aid and $124 million in PL 480. The
shortfall in aid resulted from a variety of factors, to be discussed below, but
the initial expectations on the part of the Turkish planners were probably
overoptimistic under the best of circumstances.'
The SFYP.The SFYP covered the period 1968 to 1972. The basic goal
of a 7 per cent growth rate in GNPwasretained, as was the aim of reduced
dependence upon foreign aid which was to fall from 2 per cent of GNP to 1.7
per cent of GNP over the five-year period. Emphasis upon industrial develop-
ment intensified somewhat, as industrial output was projected to increase at
an average rate of 12 per cent per annum. Private investment was expected to
increase at an annual rate of 12.5 per cent, and public investment at 10 per
cent, with private consumption increasing 5.1 per cent annually.'6 As indi-
cated above, the shift in the share of investment and other changes in empha-
sis reflected the philosophies of the different ruling parties between the early
and late 1960's. Other features of the SFYP were similar to the FFYP: a
continued shift away from agriculture and toward industry, with a view to
changing the structure of the Turkish economy; increased savings in the pub-
lie and private sectors to raise the rate of capital formation; and emphasis
upon import-substitution and export promotion for non-traditional goods.
At the time of writing, data are not available to compare the SFYP goals
with achievements. During the first three years of the Plan, GNP increased by
6.7, 6.3 and 5.7 per cent (provisional SPO estimates) evaluated at 1965
prices, while agricultural production grew by only 1.9, 0.0 and Li per cent,
respectively. Failure to attain the overall target growth rate thus primarily
reflects a relatively slow increase in agricultural output. In view of the rela-
tively poor performance of agriculture over the first three years, the growth
rates of other sectors were probably generally higher than the Plan targets.
In broad outline, the two Turkish Five Year Plans have been quite similar
and have corresponded closely with actual government development policy.
We turn now to an examination of the role assigned to the trade and pay-
ments regime within the two Plans.
15. For a more detailed evaluation of the FFYP, see: Wayne Snyder, "Turkish Economic
Developments: the First Five Year Plan," Journal of Development Studies, Oct.
1969; Baran Tuncer, "Development of the Turkish Economy: An Experience in
Planning," Yale Economic Growth Center, Paper No. 112, May 1971; and the
SFYP, op. cit. (Note 21, Chap. I).
16. SFYP, op. cit. (Note 21, Chap. I), pp. 74 ff.In the macroeconomic projections underlying each Plan, the chief role
assigned to the foreign trade sector was that of meeting a projected savings-
investment gap, especially in the early years of the fifteen-year horizon pe-
riod. Beyond that, both Plans assigned three functions to the foreign trade
sector: (1) to enable the importation of capital goods and inputs needed for
the growth of the industrial sector through growth of foreign.exchange earn-
ings; (2) to provide a mechanism (in coordination with other policy instru-
ments) to foster the growth of new industries; and (3) to diversify the struc-
ture of Turkey's exports and to aim at rapid growth of industrial exports as
one means of altering the structure of the Turkish economy.
Significantly, neither the Plans nor the "Objectives and Strategy" focussed
upon Turkey's projected Common Market membership, despite the fact that
the initial protocols for Associate Membership were already in preparation
and signed in 1963. The only statement in the FFYP was that:
The economic implications for Turkey of the Common Market, which were taken
into account while preparing the plan, will also be carefully estimated in preparing
annual programs. 17
TheSFYP was even less specific on the implications of the Common Market,
referring to the need to "strengthen the Turkish economy to the desired
level" during the preparatory period then in progress.'
Investment and raw materials requirements
In addition to the need for foreign assistance to meet the projected invest-
ment-savings gap, both Plans viewed growth in foreign-exchange earnings as
necessary in order to provide a means of importing capital and intermediate
goods required to attain the Plan objectives:
A considerable increase in imports is to be expected as a result of development
efforts. Newinvestmentsand the maintenance of existing establishments will create a
demand for capital goods...
Itwas stressed in the FFYP that one criterion upon which new industries
should be evaluated was their expected utilization of domestic, as contrasted
with imported, raw materials in an effort to reduce the demand for imports.
Moreover, criteria for import licensing were to be:
Import programs will give priority to imports which contribute to the realization of
17. FFYP, op. cit. (Note 20, Chap. 1), p. 460.
18. SFYP, op. cit. (Note 21, Chap. I), pp. 136—7.
19. FFYP, op. cit. (Note 20, Chap. 1), p. 459.
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plan targets. The import requirement of the industries concerned wilt be examined
and fulfilled in the light of their implication for the plan.2°
Again,
The scarce foreign exchange resources will be directed to the economic activities
which are directly related to economic development. The import of luxury goods will
be avoided.2'
This emphasis was borne out in the composition of imports projected
under the two Plans. Table V-2 gives the actual composition of imports for
the period 1961 to 1970 and the planned projections for the period 1963
to 1970. The planned figures are those given in the FFYP and SFYP. These
figures were subsequently revised in the Annual Programs as evidence on
actual imports emerged. In the FFYP the raw material requirements gener-
ated by the Plan were substantially underestimated. Imports of investment
goods fell short of their planned levels due largely to the shortfall in invest-
ment. As Table V-2 indicates, SPO projections for the First Plan period were
that raw materials imports would be less than investment goods imports in
the early years of the Plan, reaching about equal magnitude in later years. In
every year of both Plans to date, in fact, raw material imports have exceeded
investment goods imports by sizeable margins. The planners took this into
20. Ibid., p.471.
21. SFYP, op. cit. (Note 21, Chap. I), p. 132.
Table V-2













1961 185 — 208 — 116
1962 — 228 — 292 — 102
1963 241 254 235 332 71 102
1964 274 197 261 296 76 44
1965 296 197 300 313 85 62
1966 333 289 325 365 87 64
1967 363 260 363 380 94 45
1968 332 325 418 394 85 45
1969 350 251 460 431 90 119
1970 370 215 510 583 95 137
Note: PL 480 imports are not included.
Source:FFYP, op. cit. (Note 20, Chap. I) and SFYP, op. cit. (Note 21, Chap. I), for
planned figures; and SPO, Annual Programs for actual figures.128 Planning and theTrade Regime in the 1960's
accountin formulating the SFYP, as can be seen by inspection of the altered
relationship between investment goods and raw materials imports planned for
the years 1968 to 1970. Even that was not enough, as imports of raw mate-
rials and intermediate goods generally exceeded Plan levels, while imports of
investment goods fell far short of them.
Part of the strategy of the FFYP was to reduce drastically the level of
consumer goods imports. In 1964, after the surge of imports in 1963, con.
sumer goods imports were cut even below planned levels. The figures given
for consumer goods imports are, as pointed out by SPO, misleading because
of smuggling:
During the last years of the [first] plan period, however, consumer goods of luxury
nature which had been smuggled into the country began to appear in the markets of
large cities. Therefore, the actual volume of consumer goods imports was higher than
that indicated in the balance of payments.22
Fostering the growth of new industries
The second way in which the trade and payments regime was regarded as
an instrument of development policy pertained to the industrialization objec-
tive. The strategy for industrialization was oriented toward import-substitu-
tion. To conserve scarce foreign exchange, it was declared in the FFYP that
the list of items eligible for importation should be determined on
.the principle that goods of which internal production is quantitatively and qualita-
tively sufficient to meet internal requirements at fair prices should not be in-
cluded...23
Similarly, goods for which there was some domestic production would be
subject to import quotas and luxury goods would not be importable.24 The
SFYP reiterated the policy.25
Both Plans stressed the need for insuring that the choice of import-substi-
tution industries should be based upon their long-term competitiveness, and
that import restrictions and protection accorded to those industries should
be of a temporary nature.
Keeping in mind the necessity for the protection of newly established or developing
branches of industry, imports will be restricted over a period of time specified in
advance, when deemed necessary, and the possibility of importing goods outside the
system will be avoided. This protection, however, will not be extended to the
22.Ibid.,p.29.
23. FFYP, op.cit. (Note20, Chap. I), p. 471.
24. SFYP,op. cit.(Note21, chap. I), p. 578.
25.IbicL,p.134.
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branches of industry which are not likely to gain a competitive position in the
future.26
In practice, there have been virtually no instances of reentering an item on
the import lists once domestic production has been established. Even with
regard to new industries, the long-term competitiveness criterion does not
appear to have become operational. In the shipbuilding industry, for example,
it was determined that "significant exports are out of the question in this
sector,"2 7owingto "too much competition from foreign markets."2
8How-
ever, the principle enunciated for that industry was that "the demand for
shipbuilding will be met domestically."29 Similarly, many assembly indus-
tries were started during the FFYP. For a typical item —farmmachinery —
theSFYP stated that:
the percentage of locally manufactured components of agricultural equipment and
machinery will be increased on a large scale and, to that end, the development of
those branches of industry which will manufacture domestic inputs will be encour-
aged.
Objectives for other assembly industries were similar.
There can be little doubt that the two Five Year Plans were heavily biased
toward import-substitution. In the FFYP balance-of-payments, considerations
(aside from the estimated required foreign aid) were evaluated in the final
chapter of the document, almost as an afterthought. Little stress was placed
upon the need for growth of foreign exchange earnings. Requirements for
foreign aid were estimated by the macroeconomic investment-savings gap
projections.
By the time the SFYP was formulated, balance-of-payments difficulties
were highly visible and the import-substitution strategy was intensified. The
SFYP repeatedly noted the relatively high prices of Turkish manufactured
products:
The price of industrial goods produced in Turkey is usually higher than world prices.
This question constitutes a problem which requires study and which must be solved
quickly.3'
Interestingly, one of the causes of these high prices was said to be "protective
customs policies."32 Yet other causes were the "excessively high import
duties on investment goods, the high cost of basic industrial raw materials and
26. Ibict, p. 134, see also p. 404.
27. Ibid., p. 578.
28. Ibid., p. 575.
29. Ibid., p. 574.
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services to the manufactures Quantitative restrictions were not men-
tioned. Concern with high costs was a factor motivating the altered treatment
of duties upon imported capital equipment in 1968.
Thus in the FFYP, import-substitution was adopted primarily as a means of
attaining the industrialization goal. By the time of the SFYP the motivation
for stress upon import-substitution had shifted and stemmed much more
from balance-of-payments difficulties.
Export goals and achievements
Both Plans revealed considerable pessimism about the prospects for in-
creased foreign exchange earnings from traditional exports:
Demand elasticity for Turkey's export goods is low. The studies made on this subject
show that the elasticity of the main export products, mohair excepted, is near zero.
It follows from this that no significant development can be expected in export of
these goods and that a change in the composition of Turkey's exports is essentiaL34
33. Ibid., p. 403.
34. FFYP, op. cit.(Note 20, Chap. I), p. 465. Inconsistently, the next paragraph went
on to state that, "Since 1958, ..thewholesale price indices of foodstuffs and raw
materials have shown a steady increase ...Onthe other hand, raw material prices
have been falling on international markets. This, together with the rise in internal
prices has impaired Turkey's competitive position on export markets as a primary
product exporter." No action was recommended, however.
Table V-3






1963 270 284 22 Il 56 73 348 368
1964 291 312 22 15 61 84 374 411
1965 298 352 24 21 71 90 394 464
1966 329 379 24 23 73 88 427 491
1967 348 426 26 21 82 76 510 522
1968 409 405 31 26 100 66 540 496
1969 427 402 34 35 114 99 575 537
1970 445 n.a. 37 n.a. 133 n.a. 615 588
1971 465 — 40 — 160 — 665 —
1972 481 — 42 — 197 — 720 —
Sources: FFYP, op. cit. (Note 20, Chap. I), p. 469; SFYP, op. cit. (Note 21, Chap. 1),
pp. 32 and 100; Yth Program: 1971, pp. 35—36.The SFYP similarly stressed the need for structural change in the composi-
tion of export earnings, pointing out that,
The export of agricultural products...which is more or less limited by foreign demand
is estimated to register an increase of only 22.9 per cent [over the SFYP period]
despite efforts to be made in this field.
Insofar as either Plan stressed exports at all, the emphasis was on the develop-
ment of new export products. In general, export performance was better than
planned in the FFYP and below Plan levels from 1968 until 1970. This can be
seen in Table V-3, where export projections and actual exports are con-
trasted. Throughout the FFYP agricultural exports did far better than had
been anticipated in the Plan, whereas mineral exports did somewhat worse,
particularly in the early years of the Plan period. The SPO classification of
industrial exports is somewhat broader than that generally used, including
most copper exports in particular. Until 1966 industrial exports grew more
rapidly than had been anticipated in the Plan, but thereafter earnings from
those commodities did noticeably less well than expectations.
Examination of the determinants of exports is left to Chapter VII, below.
Here it need only be noted that the Plans placed relatively little reliance upon
the development of traditional exports, and viewed export strategy as con-
forming to the overall strategy of industrialization of the Turkish economy.
Even for industrialization, however, far less emphasis was placed upon export
possibilities than upon import-substitution.
As noted above, an important goal was the attainment of "self-sufficien-
cy," the ability to continue 7 per cent growth without net receipts of foreign
aid, by 1977. This goal was to be achieved through receipt of high levels of
aid in the early years of the fifteen-year period which, it was expected, would
induce a rising marginal and average domestic savings ratio. Aid in the early
years was deemed essential, not only to make up the savings-investment gap,
but also because of Turkey's relatively heavy debt-servicing obligations. With-
out aid in the early Plan years, debt servicing would have drained off sizeable
resources from the development effort.
Debt service
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Sources: FFYP, op. cit. (Note 20, Chap. I), p. 467 and John White, Pledged to Devel-
opment, Overseas Development Institute (London), 1967, p. 148.
and must be considered jointly with them. It was the conjunction of rapidly
increasing import demands associated with the implementation of the FFYP
and the failure of the net capital inflow to reach Plan levels that marked the
transition to Phase II in 1964.
Table V-4 gives the basic data for 1963 and 1964. As can be seen, the gross
capital inflow was less than half the planned level in each year. Given debt-
servicing obligations, however, the result was a net inflow of one.quarter and
one-sixth the planned amounts in the two years. Turkey's scheduled debt.
servicing obligations for 1965 through 1967 were even greater than the 1963
and 1964 amounts. It became apparent that balance-of-payments difficulties
would become massive and that the FFYP would be infeasible in the absence
of some additional assistance. Finally, further debt rescheduling was agreed
upon in the early months of1965.36
The schedule of debt service in effect prior to rescheduling and the revised
schedule are given in Table V.5 -Ascan be seen, relief from debt obligations
amounted to over $100 million in 1965, and an additional $115 million over
the next two years. Additional loans, extended after April 1965, and loans
that did not come under the purview of the revision led to heavier actual debt
repayments and interest charges than were indicated in the revised amortiza-
tion schedule. However, debt-servicing obligations in the 1966—1968 period
were considerably less than had been anticipated, with a rising debt burden
toward the end of the period. Even so, actual debt repayments plus interest
amounted to $935 million over the period 1965 to 1970, compared to total
export earnings of $3,098 million.3' Thus by any standard, debt repayment
36. White, op. cit. (Table.V.4), p. 149.
37. See Table V.6.
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Table V-4
Actual and planned capital flows, 1963 and 1964 (millions of U.S. dollars)
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Total 1253 307 1559 1232 300 1532
and interest charges constituted a sizeable burden upon the Turkish economy.
The debt repayment schedule makes the interpretation of Turkish foreign
aid figures difficult, since the lenders considered that debt postponement
constituted part of their net aid contribution. Thus it makes a considerable
difference whether net or gross aid figures are used.
Aid flows38
Turkey's history of chaotic indebtedness led to considerable reluctance,
particularly on the part of the Western European countries, to extend devel-
opment aid at the outset of the FFYP. There appear to have been doubts
about Turkey's ability to carry out a rational debt management program,
much less embark upon a systematic development effort. Only the United
States among the potential donors exhibited any enthusiasm for the FFYP,
whereas the Turks had assumed that sizeable foreign assistance would be
forthcoming in the early stages.
For a variety of reasons, among which the history of past indebtedness was
prominent, a Consortium under the aegis of the OECD was formed to coordi-
nate the contributions of all donors to the Turkish development effort. The
Consortium started operations in 1963 coincident with the start of the FFYP.
Throughout the period during which the plans have been in operation, the
preponderance of foreign aid has come through the Consortium.
Turkey's relationship with the Consortium was by no means an easy one,
38. The material in this section on the development of the Consortium is drawn from
White, op. cit. (Table V-4).
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Total 145 141 191148133 106 152205
NetAid 215 72 64 112 88166 169274
Note:All data are from Turkish balance-of-payments figures.
Sources:1963—1965, SFYP, op. cit. (Note 21, Chap. I), p. 28.
1966—1967, YEll Program: 1968, p. 59.
1968—1970, Monthly Economic Indicators, Ministry of Finance, January 1972,
p.51.
especiallyin the early years. A major difficulty before 1965 was that Consor-
tium aid to Turkey was made on an annual basis. From the planners' view-
point, the fact that Consortium decisions as to aid in any given year were
made in that year was worse yet. Thus the Turkish planners generally drew
up their Annual Programs in a state of uncertainty about the amount of aid
likely to be pledged.39
Data on the amount of gross and net aid received by Turkey are given in
Table V-6. The high figure for 1963 reflects aid associated with the construc-
tion of the Steel Mill and other once-and-for-all items. Similarly, the
high 1970 figure reflects Consortium credits extended at the time of devalua-
tion in August 1970. Only in those two years did net aid exceed 2 per cent of
GNP. Project credits increased from $36 million to $179 million over the
1964-to-1970 period. Consortium credits by contrast reached a peak of $175
million in 1966 and declined to $106 million in 1969, rising again however to
$217 million in 1970, under the special conditions just noted. PL 480 aid was
not received in 1967 and 1968, and was important only in 1963 and 1970.
The steady increase in project aid indicates one of the reasons for both the
slow pace of aid-giving in the early years of the FFYP and the lower-than-
planned real investment levels: there simply were insufficient investment pro-
39. Theproblem wasespecially severe in 1964 when nopledges for 1964 were made until
thevery end of the year.
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TableV-6
Gross and net aid flows, 1963 to 1970 (millions of U.S. dollars)
I
1963 1964 19651966196719681969 1970
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jects drawn up and ready to be implemented. While this factor was not the
only reason for the shortfall of aid and investment levels in the early years of
the FFYP, the SPO itself attributed the lagging investment performance in
part to a lack of detailed projects.4° Part of the increased volume of project
credits in later years undoubtedly resulted from the government efforts early
in the FFYP to improve project preparation.
Private foreign capital
Throughout the 1950's and 1960's the Turkish government attempted to
attract private foreign capital. One of the aims of the 1958 Stabilization
Program was to improve conditions so that private capital inflows might
increase markedly. Also, while a goal of the fifteen-year perspective plan was
to eliminate dependence on official capital, it was stated that private capital
inflows would be welcome and relied upon even after 1977.
Despite official policy to encourage it, private foreign capital has not been
a major factor in Turkey's foreign exchange receipts and balance-of-payments
experience.4' The total net private capital inflow from 1963 to 1969 was
$51 million and there was a net outflow in all but two of those years.42 Thus
private foreign investment has played a very small role in Turkey's balance of
payments or growth over the years, unlike official capital flows.
V. Relationship of trade and development policy
The intent of the planners at the outset of the FFYP was to use the
foreign trade regime as an instrument of policy to help achieve Turkey's
development goals. In that sense it was intended that the foreign trade regime
be permissive in enabling the implementation of development policy. The
FFYP emphasized import-substitution as a component of development poli-
cy, although the emphasis was qualified by recognition of the need for eco-
nomic efficiency. Relatively little attention was devoted to ways and means
of promoting exports, in part because the import demands projected by the
Plan were expected to be covered by anticipated export earnings and aid
flows.
A variety of factors soon altered the situation. Although foreign exchange
40. SFYP, op. cit. (Note 21, Chap. 1), p. 15.
41. The one exception was private foreign investment in petroleum, which was sizeable
in the late 1950's. The petroleum investments were encouraged by special legislation
and not by the general law covering private foreign investment.
42. See Table 1-6.136 Planningand the TradeRegimein the 1960's
earnings exceeded expectations, import demands under the import regime as
it was at the outset would have greatly exceeded available foreign exchange
resources. Imports over the FFYP as a whole were held very close to projec-
tions, but the attainment of target levels was accomplished because of in-
creased stringency of the import regime rather than because the initial projec-
tions were accurate.
Even if net aid had been forthcoming at somewhere near planned levels,
some change in the import regime would have been required to restrict im-
ports to levels consistent with foreign exchange availability. However, if net
aid had reached planned levels, the import regime in 1964 and after would
have been considerably less restrictive than it was. The heightened exchange
controls of the 1960's were in response to balance-of-payments difficulties
rather than development goals, and emphasis upon import-substitution in-
creased, not to attain the industrialization targets, but to offset unanticipated
foreign exchange shortfalls. Hence a trade regime which started as permissive
of development policy was quickly transformed into one which dictated the
shape of development policy. While import-substitution would have been
emphasized in any event, it is probable that more attention would have been
given to "competitiveness" and to the criteria for selecting industries dis-
cussed in the Plans had it not been for the foreign exchange shortage which
emerged as an impediment to the implementation of the development Plans.
Development policy therefore quickly became shaped by the apparent dic-
tates of the balance-of-payments rather than the converse.
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